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INTRODUCTION
Barrett et al. (2014) argue that the primary
contribution of evolutionary psychology
(EP), as defined by the Santa Barbara
school (Cosmides and Tooby, 1987; see
also Laland and Brown, 2011) is the con-
ception of the mind as a collection of sepa-
rate, domain-specific mental modules that
evolved to solve specific adaptive prob-
lems. This, they argue, means that EP does
not represent a true alternative to com-
putational models of mind and is there-
fore not a significant advance on more
traditional cognitive approaches. Instead,
they recommend that e-cognition, and in
particular the concept of the extended
mind, can best enhance our understand-
ing of human mind and behavior. While
we appreciate Barrett et al.’s enthusiasm for
an interesting and relatively new approach
to understanding mind and behavior, we
argue here that, independent of the verac-
ity of the concept of massive modularity
(which is an empirical question; Barrett
et al., 2014; Burke, 2014; Stephen, 2014),
an evolutionary approach provides a sub-
stantial advance in the understanding of
mind and behavior. Here, we make two
main arguments. First, we argue that a
full understanding of mind, brain and
behavior requires the consideration of all
four of Tinbergen’s levels of explanation,
which can only be achieved by approach-
ing the problem through the lens of evo-
lution (independent of the assumption of
massive, domain-specific modularity, or of
any other model). Second, we argue that
the embodied cognition approach advo-
cated by Barrett et al. (2014) is actu-
ally better understood as an extension
of traditional causal (mechanistic), and
ontogenetic (developmental) approaches
than as a revolutionary approach in its
own right, and therefore is best examined
through the lens of evolution.
THE VALUE OF EVOLUTIONARY
APPROACHES TO MIND AND
BEHAVIOR
In what is now widely considered the
foundational document of human ethol-
ogy, Niko Tinbergen makes the case that
behavior can be addressed at four differ-
ent explanatory levels (Tinbergen, 1963).
In addition to the causal (or mechanis-
tic) and ontogenetic (developmental) levels
of explanation that are typical of modern
psychology, Tinbergen proposed that a full
understanding of behavior requires that
we consider two additional, evolutionary
levels of explanation. The phylogenetic
level considers the evolutionary history of
the behavior, and the functional level con-
siders what he calls the survival value,
or what modern evolutionists would call
the fitness value or selective value of the
behavior (though more recently, O’Brien
and Gallup, 2011, have suggested that the
role of culture represents a fifth level of
explanation). While Barrett et al. (2014)
assert that the primary advance offered by
EP is the conception of the mind as mas-
sively modular, we suggest that the defin-
ing feature of evolutionary approaches to
psychology is simply the application of the
evolutionary concepts of selection and fit-
ness to human behavior. This approach
allows us to address human psychol-
ogy through Tinbergen’s phylogenetic and
functional levels of explanation, providing
novel hypotheses and a more thorough
understanding of the subject. Despite
rarely being acknowledged directly, these
principles are applied in a range of evolu-
tionary approaches to mind and behavior
(e.g., Stephen, 2013).
This application of evolutionary con-
cepts to psychology is not reliant on the
assumption of massive, domain-specific
modularity, since predictions derived from
such an assumption are often identi-
cal to those derived from evolutionary
approaches based on plasticity, domain-
generality, and cultural evolution. What
changes is merely the level on which selec-
tion is assumed to act. Whereas a Santa-
Barbara school Evolutionary Psychologist
would think of selection as acting upon
genes coding for domain-specific, yet flex-
ible, mental modules, a more domain-
general evolutionary approach would see
selection as acting upon the behaviors
themselves. In either case, the behaviors
and cognitions selected for and against
remain the same (Burke, 2014; Stephen,
2014). Indeed, the majority of research in
this area does not make direct assump-
tions about massive modularity or lack
thereof (Burke, 2014; Stephen, 2014). The
question of whether the mind is massively
modular and domain-specific or plas-
tic and culturally selected remains, then,
an important empirical question (Barrett
et al., 2014), but one that is tangential to
the issue of whether evolution offers a use-
ful contribution to the study of mind and
behavior (Stephen, 2014).
Irrespective, then, of the unit of selec-
tion, we suggest that an evolutionary
approach can offer unique insights into
understanding and predicting behavior.
Indeed, most of the added value brought
by an evolutionary approach is reflected
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in the two neglected aspects (for psy-
chology at least) of Tinbergen’s etholog-
ical approach to behavior. Evolutionary
psychologists are perhaps with good rea-
son shy of admitting that consideration
of function may be useful when think-
ing about behavior. Much of this concern
relates to a posteriori reasoning, and the
criticism of “just so stories.” However, a
consideration of function a priori can be
a powerful aid to theorizing and hypoth-
esis generation. In research on disgust,
for example, the principal driver behind
studying this emotion’s relationship with
the immune system was based upon the
idea that disgust functions to aid dis-
ease avoidance (Stevenson et al., 2011).
Without a consideration of the functional
value of this emotion, such avenues of
enquiry would not have been envisaged.
A further benefit of an evolutionary
approach is in consideration of the phy-
logenetic origin of a particular behav-
ior. This seems to be a more neglected
line of reasoning within human EP, but
it can be highly instructive. Again, take
disgust as an illustrative example. It has
been argued that disgust is a uniquely
human emotion, with a small phyloge-
netic “tail” (Rozin et al., 2010). This
“tail” extends into other mammals (and
beyond) and has been termed “distaste.”
Distaste functions primarily as a specific
defense against consuming bitter (poi-
sonous) food. However, mammals and
indeed all animals face similar pathogen
threats to humans, and it would be sur-
prising if we did not also share some of
the same basic behaviors to avoid getting
sick. In fact, a very extensive set of disease
avoidant behaviors have been documented
in animals (e.g., Hart, 2011) but surpris-
ingly, almost no research has explored
whether the emotion of disgust plays a
role in animal disease avoidance. Not only,
then, can the idea of phylogenetic con-
tinuity act to stimulate new avenues for
research, it can also act to complement
the functional approach. For example, if
animals do use disgust to assist disease
avoidance, this would be consistent with
the functional interpretation of disgust in
humans. Further, Schaller and Murray’s
(2008) finding of regional personality dif-
ferences corresponding to pathogen preva-
lence offers a clear illustration of the use of
evolutionary theorizing to generate novel
predictions across multiple levels to draw
a connection between traditionally dis-
parate domains. Crucially, none of this the-
orizing relies upon a commitment to any
particular theory of the unit of selection.
Intra-species color cues may be taken
as another example of a phylogenetic
approach that has advanced our under-
standing of human behavior. Color is fre-
quently used to convey information in
non-human animals. For example, male
hooded vultures have highly vascularized,
exposed skin on their heads, which flush
red during antagonistic encounters, and
male ostriches show redder necks dur-
ing the mating season, suggesting that
this hemoglobin-based coloration is a
cue to dominance and fertility (Negro
et al., 2006). A phylogenetic approach
allows us to make predictions about the
kinds of perceptual biases and behav-
iors that we expect to see in humans
and other species. We know that the
majority of mammals have only dichro-
matic vision that precludes the differen-
tiation of red from green (Carroll et al.,
2001), whereas old world, and some
new world, primates have trichromatic
vision. The phylogenetic approach thus
allows us to predict that we may see
red cues in primates, including humans
and old world monkeys, but not in non-
primate mammals, and new world mon-
keys with dichromatic vision (Changizi
et al., 2006). This is indeed what we
see. The red coloration of mandrills’
faces increases with higher position in
the dominance hierarchy and with higher
testosterone (Setchell and Dixson, 2001).
During antagonistic confrontations, the
less red male is more likely to back
down (Setchell and Wickings, 2005), and
female mandrills prefer to mate with red-
der faced males, irrespective of alpha sta-
tus (Setchell, 2005). Similarly, in humans,
we see redder facial skin in men inter-
preted as appearing more aggressive, dom-
inant, attractive (Stephen et al., 2012), and
healthy (Stephen et al., 2009a,b). Indeed,
it has been suggested that one evolved
function of trichromatic vision in primates
may be to enable individuals to identify
color-based social cues (Changizi et al.,
2006).
This prediction of human psychological
traits based on phylogenetic approaches,
then, allows enhanced predictive power
and greater understanding of the
psychology of humans.
e-COGNITION’S PROXIMAL
EXPLANATORY NATURE
Barrett et al. (2014) suggest that an alter-
native to the standard computational the-
ories of mind (in which they include
Santa Barbara school EP) is the vari-
ous e-cognition approaches. They focus
on one form, the extended mind hypoth-
esis (e.g., Clark and Chalmers, 1998),
which holds that the boundaries of cogni-
tion extend well beyond the central ner-
vous system, so that the body and the
environment form a coupled system that
governs behavior. The main benefit of
such an approach, according to Barrett
et al. (2014), is that it encompasses the
complex array of external features (e.g.,
written language, visual aids, etc.) that
shape human behavior in the current
environment.
While we agree that e-cognition
approaches offer potentially interest-
ing ways of understanding behavior, we
would also argue that they are essen-
tially elaborations of the computational
models of mind that Barrett et al.
(2014) criticize, representing extensions
of Tinbergen’s (1963) causal (mecha-
nistic), and ontogenetic (developmental)
levels of explanation. Extending the
boundary of cognition to include objects
that are not typically considered as
part of the cognitive system (e.g., a
shopping-list memory aid) does not
address a functional or phylogenetic level
of analysis, any more than does a stan-
dard computational approach. This can
only be achieved by studying behavior
through the evolutionary concepts of
selection and fitness. As such, Barrett
et al.’s suggested alternative to EP—e-
cognition—does not represent a true
alternative to computational models
of mind, but rather an extension of
these approaches that should be best
approached through the lens of evolu-
tionary theory. In this way, Barrett et al.’s
(2014) conception of e-cognition as an
alternative to evolutionary approaches
to cognition and behavior mischar-
acterizes e-cognition as an ultimate
explanatory framework, when it should
properly be considered proximal (see
Scott-Phillips et al., 2011, for similar
arguments in response to previously pro-
posed alternative ultimate explanatory
frameworks, such as cultural evolution
and epigenetics).
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CONCLUSIONS
Accordingly, we argue that evolutionary
approaches provide significant additional
predictive and explanatory value above
standard computational models by allow-
ing researchers to address the phyloge-
netic and functional levels of explanation.
Evolutionary approaches to mind and
behavior, then, go well beyond existing
approaches in their potential to provide an
understanding, not necessarily of the how,
but of the why, humans behave as they
do in an unpredictable world. Consider,
for example, the richness and complex-
ity of human emotion: forged over the
course of human evolution and respond-
ing to present day triggers, the passions
drive behavior—albeit often to dysfunc-
tional ends within modern societies (e.g.,
Fitness and Case, 2003). Understanding
such diverse emotions as anger, jealousy,
hate, love, disgust, or shame as evolu-
tion’s executioners (Wright, 1995) pro-
vides us with an answer to the question
of the “why” of behavior that cannot be
addressed by only causal and ontogenetic
levels of analysis. In short, e-cognition
accounts, along with other approaches that
do not hold the evolutionary principles
of selection and fitness as central repre-
sent only extensions of themore proximate
explanations of mind and behavior, rather
than providing the fuller understanding
of cognition and behavior that ensues
from phylogenetic and functional level of
explanations. Further, one extraordinary
achievement of evolutionary approaches
to mind and behavior has been to demon-
strate the commonalities shared by human
beings across time and space as a func-
tion of the adaptive problems they have
always faced, and continue to face, as social
animals who depend upon one another
for their survival. Certainly, humans today
are confronted with a material, techno-
logical world that could not be imagined
by humans who lived thousands of years
ago. However, a baby from our recent evo-
lutionary past miraculously transported
through time to a modern Western envi-
ronment would still crave attachment and
belonging, experience, and respond to the
world and others through her senses and
feelings, and learn through language how
to interpret, communicate, and function
more or less adaptively in that environ-
ment, just as babies raised in regions geo-
graphically distant from their ancestral
homelands do today. No doubt she would
also help her parents program their latest
iPhone along the way.
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